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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	AMELIA ANN ALBANO, CITY ATTORNEY (SBN 103640) CAROL A. HUMISTON, SR. ASST. CITY ATTORNEY, (SBN 115592) OFFICE OF CITY ATTORNEY CITY OF BURBANK 275 East Olive Avenue P. O. Box 6459 Burbank, CA 91510 Tel: (818) 238-5707 Fax: (818) 238-5724 LINDA MILLER SAVITT, SBN 94164 E-mail: LSavitt@brgslaw.com BALLARD ROSENBERG GOLPER & SAVIT 500 North Brand Boulevard, 20 th Floor Glendale, CA 91203 Tel: (818) 508-3700, Fax: (818) 506-4827 RONALD F. FRANK (SBN 109076) E-mail: rfrank@bwslaw.com ROBERT J. TYSON (SBN 187311) E-mail: rtyson@bwslaw.com BURKE, WILLIAMS & SORENSEN, LLP 444 S. Flower Street, 24 th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90071 Tel: 213-236-0600 Fax: 213-236-2700 Attorneys for Defendant City of Burbank	CHIMCAPP CHAMPAT PURSUANT TO GOVERNMENT CODE § 6103 2012 MAY 31 PM 4: 27	
17	GURERIOR COURT OF	THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA	
18	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES		
19)	~ N DC 422252	
20		Assigned to: Hon John L. Segai, Dept. 30	
2	No.	DEFENDANT CITY OF BURBANK'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE IN	
2	OITY OF BURBANK and	SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR ALTERNATIVE JNOV	
	DOES 1 through 100, inclusive,	DATE: June 6, 2012	
	Defendants.	TIME: 8:30 a.m.	
	26	Trial Date: March 5, 2012 Action Filed: Sept. 22, 2009	
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RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE

Together with his Opposition Memorandum, Plaintiff submitted an oddly formatted series of shotgun objections to virtually every sentence of every declaration the City submitted in support of its Motion for New Trial or, in the Alternative, Motion for JNOV. The objections are simply listed by grounds without any specificity as to what statements in the Declaration are objectionable and without any explanation to enable the Court to rule on the objections without jumping back and forth between each Declaration and the objections. Most of those objections completely lack merit; others have some merit and are conceded, and still others can be addressed by explanation and response.

A. Response to the 61 Objections to Carol Amberg Declaration

Plaintiff objected to 61 different portions of the Declaration of Carol Amberg. Ms.

Amberg is the librarian at the law firm where trial counsel Ronald Frank also works, and the primary function of her Declaration was to provide the step-by-step process she undertook that resulted in her locating the public records detailing the criminal Complaints filed against persons that Mr. Frank was able to identify as Jurors No. 6 and 7. There was no objection to Ms.

Amberg's statement of employment in Paragraph 1 of her Declaration. But virtually every other sentence drew one or multiple objections. Most of those objections lack merit and should be overruled for the reasons detailed paragraph by paragraph below. The only meritorious objections were to Ms. Amberg's summaries of the substance of the public records from the Los Angeles Superior Court website and the certified criminal records secured from the records clerks at the Hollywood and Airport Division courthouses. The City relies on those public records themselves, not Ms. Amberg's summaries of their contents, for the facts of the jurors' criminal records that are contained in the Motion for New Trial.

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As to many of the Amberg objections, plaintiff piles on extraneous objections such as "compound" and "vague and ambiguous," with no explanation as to what is vague or why a sentence in a Declaration, as opposed to a question of a witness, can be objectionably compound. City will not reiterate this point as to each of the pertinent objections since it would be the same response each time.

1. Response to Objections to all of Paragraph 2

In paragraph 2 of her Declaration, Ms. Amberg laid foundation for her later discussion of the research she undertook to attempt to identify criminal records for Jurors 6 and 7. Here is what she stated in Paragraph 2: "In my capacity as Head Librarian, I have access to a number of free and fee-based databases that I access and use to assist the lawyers and paralegals in the Firm. I have training and experience in the efficient and proper use of web-based search sites and processes, and I coordinate training by outside vendors for lawyers and paralegals in the Firm." Plaintiff's objection no. 1 is to the entire paragraph. The objections lack any merit. The relevance of Ms. Amberg's paragraph 2 is to explain her knowledge of and familiarity with the websites she later discusses. She testifies that she has personal knowledge of each of the propositions in that paragraph, so there is adequate foundation, i.e., her job-related use and knowledge of the websites, for each proposition. She did not assume any facts to be or not be in evidence, but rather described what she did and why she did it.

2. Response to Objections to all of Paragraph 3

In paragraph 3 of her Declaration, Ms. Amberg states the nature of the research project she undertook, and explained how she learned what to do. She describes the conversations she had with trial counsel with Mr. Frank and trial paralegal Mr. Kay concerning the tasks, progress, direction on areas for permissible online inquiry, and information on each juror and alternate to explain the sources of information she used for conducting on-line searches. Plaintiff's objections no. 2-5 cover the entire paragraph, and generally assert a hearsay objection. The objections lack any merit because as per Ev. Code §§ 1241 and 1250, she is offering the statements to explain what she did and why she did it, i.e., "to explain, qualify, or make understandable conduct of the declarant" and to provide her state of mind "to prove or explain acts or conduct of the declarant," rather than for any hearsay purpose. There is no speculation on Ms. Amberg's part despite plaintiff's objection no. 3 to lines 12-14; rather, she is merely reporting what Mr. Frank told her was the source of the Jurors' alphabetic "Case Info" sheet. The vagueness objection lacks merit or specificity as to what is unclear, and the Best Evidence Rule objection is silly because there is no original writing issue that is implicated by this paragraph and

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no genuine dispute exists as to the material terms of the Case Info sheet, as required by Ev. Code § 1521(1). The writing that is mentioned, the Case Info sheet, is relevant because it contained the names of the prospective trial jurors, but this was a public record provided to all trial counsel by the Court's staff at the outset of the trial.

Response to Objections to Paragraph 4 3.

In paragraph 4 of her Declaration, Ms. Amberg states that Mr. Frank asked her to perform some criminal background searches on the names given by the members of the jury, and that the outcome of those searches that revealed two who had criminal records that she found in the publically searchable databases she utilized. Plaintiff's objections no. 6-8 cover the entire paragraph except for the last sentence, and generally assert foundation and hearsay objections. The objections lack any merit because she has laid the foundation for her search process and gives an overview of the outcome of the searches, i.e., she found some criminal records for persons with the same names as jurors no. 6 and 7. Per Ev. Code §§ 1241 and 1250, she is offering the statements to explain what she did and why she did it, i.e., "to explain, qualify, or make understandable conduct of the declarant" and to provide her state of mind "to prove or explain acts or conduct of the declarant," rather than for any hearsay purpose, leaving it to the certified court records themselves the proof of details on crimes charged. There is thus no hearsay purpose and no need for her to have provided the originals or copies of the screens she was reviewing at each step of the process because they are not being offered for a hearsay purpose.

Response to Objections to all of Paragraph 5 4.

In paragraph 5 of her Declaration, Ms. Amberg states that she used the name of juror no. 6 to run various Internet searches and what those searches revealed. The substance of what the searches revealed were a website that appeared to be for a film-making business, and the reason that was pertinent was that Mr. Frank told her that juror no. 6 stated under oath during voir dire that he was a documentary film maker [1 RT 25]. Per Ev. Code §§ 1241 and 1250, Ms. Amberg is offering the statements in paragraph 5 to explain what she did and why she did it, and to prove or explain her acts and conduct, leaving it to Mr. Frank to testify to his identification of the voice

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and image of juror No. 6 as the person depicted in the website and leaving it to the trial transcript for Juror No. 6's statements of his profession. The hearsay objections thus lack merit. Because Ms. Amberg was describing a process she undertook, she was not offering these proposition for a hearsay purpose but rather to explain her steps, and then to explain that because of Mr. Frank's statement to her about identifying juror no. 6, she checked a public database with the Los Angeles Superior Court for public records, which of course is subject to the Ev. Code § 1280 public records exception to the hearsay rule. Ms. Amberg identified the website she checked as well. Plaintiff's objections no. 9-15 cover the entire paragraph 5, and lack merit for the reasons discussed above. Ms. Amberg's research trail was provided so Plaintiff could confirm the process, view the same video, hear the same audio, and thus give Plaintiff the opportunity to challenge Mr. Frank's identification of Juror No. 6. There is no such challenge in some 40 pages of opposition papers plaintiff filed. The City responds to the objections to Mr. Frank's Declaration later in this pleading

5. Response to Objections to all of Paragraph 6

In paragraph 6 of her Declaration, Ms. Amberg states what her search of the Los Angeles Superior Court's criminal case index for the person with the name of Juror No. 6 revealed, i.e., an arrest and a case number. These are not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, but rather to explain why she made a request of the attorney service to obtain a certified copy of Case Number LAH3HL01041-01 from the Hollywood Division courthouse. See Ev. Code §§ 1241, 1250. Ms. Amberg also indicated that the date of birth in the criminal Complaint matched the date of birth in her search of the LASC criminal records database, both of which are within the public records exception to the hearsay rule, Ev. Code § 1280. The City did not include the date of birth and juror names in the City's publically filed moving papers to protect juror privacy. However, the un-redacted versions of the documents were provided to plaintiff's counsel (and will be available to the Court of course during the hearing if requested). Plaintiff's objections no. 15-20 cover the entire paragraph 6, and lack merit for the reasons discussed above.

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In paragraph 7 of her Declaration, Ms. Amberg states the foundation for Exhibit 17, i.e., that it is a true and correct copy of the certified copy of the criminal case file records she received via First Legal from the Hollywood Branch of the Los Angeles Superior Court for case no.

LAH3HL01041-01. This is the criminal record for the person with the same name as Juror No. 6, whom Mr. Frank identified as that trial juror, except that the defense "redacted" his name and date of birth from the City's filed moving papers to protect Juror No. 6's privacy. Plaintiff's objections no. 21-22 cover the entire paragraph 7, and generally lack merit as discussed above. The City concedes there is merit to plaintiff's hearsay objection to Ms. Amberg's summary description of the content of the certified criminal case records, i.e., that Juror No. 6 pled "no contest" to the failure to disperse charge and that the charge of carrying a concealed weapon, described as a dirk or dagger, was dismissed. But those facts are revealed in Exhibit 17, the certified copy of the public record upon which the City relied in its Motion for New Trial.

7. Response to Objections to all of Paragraph 8

In paragraph 8 of her Declaration, Ms. Amberg states she conducted a search for Juror No. 7 on a program available through LexisNexis using just her name and "Los Angeles." The results yielded results for several people with the same name. Plaintiff's objection no. 23 covers the entire paragraph 8, but there is no hearsay being offered, no lack of foundation mentioned, and there is no Best Evidence Rule issue. Per Ev. Code §§ 1241 and 1250, she is offering the statements to explain what she did and why she did it, i.e., Ms. Amberg simply explained her process and state of mind as to why she needed to take other steps as to Juror No. 7. Juror No. 7's name was more common than that of Juror No. 6 and thus required further investigation, all of which she explained in the following paragraphs.

8. Response to Objections to all of Paragraph 9

In paragraph 9 of her Declaration, Ms. Amberg states she ran a Google search using Juror No. 7's name, "chef" (the profession juror no. 7 mentioned in her responses during jury selection [1 RT 20], and "Los Angeles." She further described that this search revealed a Twitter.com account which included a photograph which she showed to Mr. Frank and which Mr. Frank was

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9. Response to Objections to all of Paragraph 10

able to identify as a photo of trial juror no. 7. The crux of this paragraph 9 is an explanation of the

process whereby a web-based photograph of a woman was ultimately identified by Mr. Frank as

being Juror No. 7. The trail was provided so Plaintiff could confirm the process, view the same

photograph, and thus give Plaintiff the opportunity to challenge Mr. Frank's identification.

There is no such challenge in some 40 pages of opposition papers plaintiff filed. Plaintiff's

objections no. 24 - 28 pertain to Amberg Declaration paragraph 9. Per Ev. Code §§ 1241 and

simply explained her process and state of mind as to why she ultimately ordered criminal case

and its contents are within the public records exception to the hearsay rule, Ev. Code § 1280.

files for 3 specific criminal cases identified on the LASC public records database. That database

1250, she is offering the statements to explain what she did and why she did it, i.e., Ms. Amberg

In paragraph 10 of her Declaration, Ms. Amberg states she ran additional Internet searches using information she obtained from previous searches. These descriptions of the steps of the research process are not hearsay nor are they offered for a hearsay purpose. Plaintiff's objections no. 29 – 33 pertain to Amberg Declaration paragraph 10. Per Ev. Code §§ 1241 and 1250, Ms. Amberg's description of her locating and use of the food blog for a person with the same name as Juror No. 7 is to explain what she did and why she did it, i.e., Ms. Amberg simply explained her process and state of mind as to why she used that information to attempt to corroborate other information that could be used for a criminal records search. The outcome of that search was revealed in the certified criminal court records provided with the moving papers. The certified criminal proceedings and docket materials are within the public records exception to the hearsay rule, Ev. Code § 1280. The Best Evidence Rule does not pertain where as here certified public records are provided by the clerk of the court. To the extent that Ms. Amberg states her suspicions about the use of numbers in a Twitter account name, she is not offering those hunches for the truth of the matter asserted but rather to explain her state of mind and reasons for those steps in her research process.

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Superior Court's criminal case index for the person with the name of Juror No. 7 revealed, i.e., three criminal arrest and case number records. These are not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, but rather to explain why she made a request of the attorney service to obtain a certified copy of those three case numbers from the Airport Division courthouse. See Ev. Code §§ 1241 and 1250. Plaintiff's objections no. 34 – 43 pertain to Amberg Declaration paragraph 11. There is merit to plaintiff's hearsay objection to Ms. Amberg's summary description of the content of the certified criminal case records, i.e., that Juror No. 7 has multiple charges for driving without a license. But those facts are revealed in Exhibits 18 and 19, the certified copy of the public docket record for two of the three criminal cases, and in Exhibit A, B, and C being submitted with the City's Reply papers which Ms. Amberg had first requested on April 30, 2012, a month before the records clerk at the Airport courthouse finally provided the certified copies of the three complaints. The City's concurrently filed Notice of Lodging and Declaration of Federico Lozano provide the certified copies of those three Juror No. 7 criminal Complaints.

In paragraph 11 of her Declaration, Ms. Amberg states what her search of the Los Angeles

11. Response to Objections to all of Paragraph 12

In paragraph 12 of her Declaration, Ms. Amberg states she submitted a request to First Legal, a third-party vendor of attorney services, to retrieve a certified copy of the entire file for Case Numbers 9WA14122, 0WA13455, and 1WA12029. She also explained First Legal's response (i.e., that while the records were in storage at the LAX Airport courthouse location, the staff at the courthouse could not guarantee retrieval of the file and readying certified copies of the criminal case files prior to the May 7, 2012 date the motion papers were to be filed). These proposition were not offered for the truth of the matter, but instead per Ev. Code §§ 1241 and 1250 to explain why the dockets were ordered instead of having copies of the criminal Complaints and related publically-available records to file with the Motion itself. Plaintiff's objections no. 44 – 46 pertain to Amberg Declaration paragraph 12. As with the other Best Evidence Rule and speculation objections, they lack merit as this paragraph does not discuss the content of any documents and Ms. Amberg is not guessing as to any purported fact but merely

describing her actions and steps in the research process as to Juror No. 7.

12. Response to Objections to all of Paragraph 13

Plaintiff's objections no. 47-52 pertain to Amberg Declaration paragraph 13. In paragraph 13 of her Declaration, Ms. Amberg states that Exhibit 18 is a true and correct (but slightly redacted) copy of the certified copy of the docket for Los Angeles Superior Court Case no 9WA14122 that she ordered and obtained. That proposition is not hearsay but a matter within her personal knowledge, and the attached certified copies within the public records exception to the hearsay rule, Ev. Code § 1280. The Best Evidence Rule does not pertain where as here certified public records are provided by the clerk of the court. There is merit to plaintiff's hearsay objection to Ms. Amberg's summary description of the content of the certified criminal case records, i.e., that Juror No. 7 had a 2009 Complaint for driving without a license and for marijuana possession. But those facts were revealed in Exhibit 18, the certified copy of the public docket record for criminal Court Case no 9WA14122, which the City submitted as part of its moving papers. As of the time of the City's reply papers, the records clerk has finally provided certified copies of the criminal Complaint itself that Ms. Amberg had requested a month earlier. That Complaint is attached as Exhibit A to the Notice of Lodging being concurrently field with the reply papers.

13. Response to Objections to all of Paragraph 14

Plaintiff's objections no. 53-58 pertain to Amberg Declaration paragraph 14. In paragraph 14 of her Declaration, Ms. Amberg states that Exhibit 19 is a true and correct (but slightly redacted) copy of the certified copy of the docket for Los Angeles Superior Court Case no. 1WA12029 that she ordered and obtained. That proposition is not hearsay but a matter within her personal knowledge, and the attached certified copies within the public records exception to the hearsay rule, Ev. Code § 1280. The Best Evidence Rule does not pertain where as here certified public records are provided by the clerk of the court. There is merit to plaintiff's hearsay objection to Ms. Amberg's summary description of the content of the certified criminal case records, i.e., that Juror No. 7 had a 2011 Complaint for driving without a license, failed to appear as ordered and had a Bench warrant issued against her. But those facts are revealed in Exhibit 19,

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the certified copy of the public docket record for criminal Court Case no 1WA12029, which the City submitted as part of its moving papers. As of the time of the City's reply papers, the records clerk has finally provided certified copies of the criminal Complaint itself that Ms. Amberg had requested a month earlier. That Complaint is attached as Exhibit B to the Notice of Lodging being concurrently field with the reply papers.

Response to Objections to Exhibits to Amberg Declaration. 14.

Plaintiff's objections no. 59-61 pertain to the three exhibits to the Amberg Declaration. All of those exhibits are certified copies of court records subject to the public records exception to the hearsay rule, and as certified copies they are self-authenticating and thus do not lack foundation. The speculation and relevancy objections are baseless; criminal records of jurors who were asked to reveal any negative contents with police departments are obviously relevant to the issue raised by the motion for new trial as to juror misconduct.

Response to the 80 Objections to Ronald Frank Declaration B.

Plaintiff objected to 80 different portions of the Declaration of Ronald Frank, trial counsel for the City. There was no objection to the first three paragraphs of Mr. Frank's Declaration. But virtually every other sentence in the remaining 35 paragraphs of the Frank Declaration drew one or multiple objections. The plaintiff's objections² should be overruled for the reasons detailed below.

Response to Objections to Paragraph 4 of the Frank Declaration. 1.

Plaintiff's objection no. 1 to the Frank Declaration is that the following sentence is irrelevant, hearsay, lacks foundation, and assumes facts: "the fact that a prospective juror had a prior negative contact with a law enforcement official or agency, and the use of force or weapons, were all material to me and my client in assessing potential bias to be ferreted out during voir dire." The objections are silly and should be overruled. In Paragraph 4, Mr. Frank provides the

As with the Amberg objections, plaintiff piles on extraneous objections to almost every sentence in the Frank Declaration such as "compound" and "vague and ambiguous," with no explanation as to what is vague or why a sentence in a Declaration (as opposed to a question of a witness) can be objectionably compound. City will not reiterate this point as to each of the 80 objections to the Frank Declaration since it would be the same response each time.

overview for the voir dire question at issue in the juror misconduct analysis, i.e., why Mr. Frank requested that the Court ask prospective jurors about contacts with law enforcement. The quoted sentence is from Mr. Frank's personal knowledge, explains his state of mind and the reasons for making the written request for the Court to inquire of prospective jurors on specific topics, and why those question were material to the City's voir dire strategy. Ev. Code §§ 1241, 1250 are the pertinent hearsay exceptions if one were needed. Plaintiff's objection no. 2 is to a later sentence in Paragraph 4, which is "The following topics quoted from that filing were designed to reveal actual or implied bias against police agencies and officers." The same reasoning applies as stated for objection no. 1, which were the same objections described above.

Response to Objections to Paragraph 5 of the Frank Declaration. 2.

Plaintiff's objections no. 3-5 relate to Frank Declaration paragraph 5. The objections are relevance, speculation, hearsay, foundation, and assuming facts, and virtually all lack merit. In Paragraph 5, Mr. Frank explains why he included in the pleading entitled Proposed Voir Dire Questions the suggestion that the Court give prospective jurors the option of talking about their negative contacts with the police in private, i.e., to encourage honesty. Mr. Frank is relating his personal knowledge and reasoning to explain what he did and why he did it, which is not offered for any hearsay purpose but if it were it would be subject to the state of mind exception of Ev. Code § 1250. Mr. Frank also provided his personal knowledge of experience with other jurors concerning their willingness to share their arrest or criminal records with strangers, as further explanation for the suggestion of the option of a private sidebar, and the fact that one of the prospective jurors (no. 14) in fact used that option during the voir dire at the instant trial to address his own personal experience with a law enforcement officer. As to that latter point, the City concedes that prospective juror no. 14's statements as summarized by Mr. Frank are technically hearsay, so objection no. 5 on that ground is conceded.

Response to Objections to Paragraph 6 of the Frank Declaration. 3.

Plaintiff's objections no. 6-7 relate to Frank Declaration paragraph 6. The objections are relevance, speculation, hearsay, foundation, assuming facts, and best evidence rule, and virtually all lack merit. In Paragraph 6, Mr. Frank explains that the Court did not ask about all of the - 10 -

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City's requested *voir dire* topics, which is not hearsay and which is based on Mr. Frank's personal knowledge from the trial. The relevance is that the Court considered the use of force and law enforcement contact questions to be sufficiently germane and important in the case that it selected those question from the 20 or so topics the City requested as ones to actually inquire about. Mr. Frank further explains that the Court did select the negative contact and use of force topics as ones to inquire of prospective jurors, and then gives the transcript cites that include such questions and prospective jurors' answers. Mr. Frank further gave the sequence of timing of the Court's inquiries of prospective jurors about these topics, i.e., prior to attorney *voir dire*, and then again when replacement prospective jurors were seated following excusals of several jurors for cause or upon exercises by both sides of peremptory challenges. These statements are also based on Mr. Frank's personal knowledge from the trial and the conduct of the proceedings, but to the extent there is any arguable hearsay contained in the summary the transcript of trial day 1 are identified.

4. Response to Objections to Paragraph 7 of the Frank Declaration.

Plaintiff's objections no. 8-10 relate to Frank Declaration paragraph 7. The objections are relevance, speculation, hearsay, foundation, assuming facts, argumentative, and best evidence rule, and they lack merit. In Paragraph 7, Mr. Frank continues form paragraph 6 in explaining more of the voir dire process that he personally observed, i.e., that some jurors answered the law enforcement contact question and others did not. Mr. Frank states that neither of the two jurors who are the subject of the juror misconduct issues raised in the Motion for New Trial responded to the negative contact question, nor did either avail themselves of the private sidebar option. It is not hearsay to report that another person failed to speak. The fact that the two focused jurors failed to disclose anything in response to the law enforcement contact questions is plainly relevant to the juror misconduct issues raised by the Motion for New Trial, i.e., that two jurors who turned out to have criminal records failed to reveal them. There is nothing argumentative in Mr. Frank's statements in Paragraph 7; it is a fact that the City exercised its first peremptory challenge to excuse a prospective jurors who reported negative experiences with the LAPD, the same arresting agency reflected in the certified criminal records for both of jurors no. 6 and 7 who

failed to disclose their arrests by LAPD. None of the jurors who did provide information regarding experiences with law enforcement remained as seated trial jurors. Mr. Frank further detailed the dismissals for cause and peremptory challenges and identified each such prospective jurors who was dismissed, all of whom had provided information concerning their past negative contacts with law enforcement agencies other than the Burbank police department. The relevancy of those propositions is to show the materiality of the negative contact answers given, to explain a likely motive for jurors no. 6 and 7 to withhold their criminal histories in response to the Court's questions, and to demonstrate prejudice to the City from the failures to disclose that information. Mr. Frank's citations to the record for the specific answers and dismissals of the prospective jurors avoids the hearsay and best evidence rule objections, and if needed Ev. Code § 1250 provides an exception pertaining to the materiality, prejudice, and voir dire strategy issues raised.

5. Response to Objections to Paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Frank Declaration.

Plaintiff's objections no. 11-16 relate to Frank Declaration paragraph 8, and objections 17-21 relate to Frank Declaration paragraph 9. The objections are the same series as with respect to the previous paragraphs. In Paragraph 8, Mr. Frank explains more of the reasons behind the voir dire questions and his intended use of them which are relevant to the prejudice issue for juror misconduct. Paragraph 9 relates to Mr. Frank's attempts to learn prospective jurors' initial impressions, and the foundation for his thinking on that subject. These propositions are largely from Mr. Frank's personal knowledge and experience, and are not offered for any hearsay purpose but if they were they would be subject to the state of mind exception of Ev. Code § 1250. Again they are relevant to the prejudice issue and to explain the voir dire strategy that was negatively impacted by jurors' failures to disclose their initial impression and biases. With respect to the proposition based on Mr. Frank's reading of the juror literature, he provided a copy of a recent article as an exhibit to his Declaration bearing on the issue of jurors changing their initial impressions. And with respect to the Court's pre-instruction and Ms. Savitt's admonitions to jurors, Mr. Frank provided citations to the record which address the hearsay and Best Evidence Rule objections to those propositions.

6. Response to Objections to Paragraph 10 of the Frank Declaration.

Plaintiff's objections no. 22-24 relate to Frank Declaration paragraph10. The objections are the same series as with respect to the previous paragraphs. In Paragraph 10, Mr. Frank explains how he discussed the concepts embraced by CACI 2405 during his Opening Statement, and included citations to the record for each. This is not hearsay nor offered for hearsay purposes since the Opening Statement points are not offered for the truth but rather for the fact that the statements were made, demonstrating that the elements of CACI 2405 were placed in issue by the City from the earliest moments of the trial. Mr. Frank also noted that these concepts are ones he took from the *Cotran* decision and that he cited to *Cotran* in the City's settlement conference statement in November of 2011, one of the first pleadings the City filed or lodged after this Court took over the case from Judge Wiley. The latter reference is relevant to the fact that the *Cotran* defense was no last-minute concoction at trial but rather was placed in issue long before the trial. Mr. Frank has personal knowledge of each of those points.

7. Response to Objections to Paragraph 11 of the Frank Declaration.

Plaintiff's objections no. 25-27 and perhaps part of objection 28 relate to Frank

Declaration paragraph 11. The objections are the same series as with respect to the previous paragraphs. In Paragraph 11, Mr. Frank details his discovery that CACI 2405 had been inadvertently or mistakenly omitted from the defense list of proposed jury instructions and the steps taken in response to that discovery, leading up to the filing of the proposed instruction and Mr. Frank's lodging of the *Cotran* and *Nazir* published decisions. These proposition are relevant to the instructional error issue, to address the objections as to timeliness of the submission of the proposed instruction, and to lay the foundation for making a record of the City's position. They are all taken from Mr. Frank's personal knowledge. Further, Mr. Frank attests to the exhibits he attached to his Declaration; as a custodian of his Firm's records he can validly attest to and lay foundation for producing his firm's business records and files. Those include the original and modified version of plaintiff's special instruction no. 18 which were also taken from his firm's files after receipt of the proposed Sp. Instruction 18 from Mr. Brizzolara in court and the revised version generated by Mr. Kay at counsel table after the discussion of that

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instruction on the record. Ev. Code § 1271 is the business records exception to the hearsay rule.

Response to Objections to Paragraph 12 of the Frank Declaration.

Plaintiff's objections no. 29-31 appear to relate to Frank Declaration paragraph 12. The objections are the same series as with respect to the previous paragraphs. In Paragraph 12, Mr. Frank discusses his order of daily transcripts of the trial testimony and what was and was not requested by Plaintiff's counsel or ordered by the Court as to witness exclusion. These propositions are relevant to the instructional error issue on Plaintiff's special instruction no. 18, and to address the issue that there was no order prohibiting counsel from discussing another witness's testimony with a later trial witness. What the Court did not order and what plaintiff's counsel did not seek concerning witness restrictions is not hearsay, but rather is within the personal knowledge of the trial counsel who was present in court for the entire trial duration.

Response to Objections to Paragraph 13 of the Frank Declaration. 9.

Plaintiff's objection no. 32 relates to Frank Declaration paragraph 13. The objections are the same series as with respect to the previous paragraphs, plus adding an argumentative objection. In Paragraph 12, Mr. Frank discusses Lt. Puglisi, what the Court did not order, and the fact of Mr. Frank's personal knowledge that Lt. Puglisi was never present in the courtroom while another witness was testifying in this trial. The propositions in this 6-line paragraph are relevant to the instructional error issue on Plaintiff's special instruction no. 18. There was no speculation about the fact that the Court did not order counsel to refrain from discussing another witnesses' testimony with later trial witnesses, nor are the stated propositions of fact argumentative. While the statement that Lt. Puglisi did not violate the witness exclusion order is a conclusion of mixed law and fact, there was no such objection tendered by Plaintiff and the remaining sentences in the paragraph lay the foundation for that conclusion.

Response to Objections to Paragraph 14 of the Frank Declaration. 10.

Plaintiff's objection no. 33 relates to portions of Frank Declaration paragraph 14. The objections are the same series as with respect to the previous paragraphs, plus an argumentative objection. In Paragraph 13, Mr. Frank discusses Lt. Puglisi's cross-examination on the issue of what the witness had read to help him prepare to testify. That Paragraph also recites the fact that

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Mr. Smith did not specifically ask Lt. Puglisi if he had reviewed depositions or other testimony of trial witnesses. It included Mr. Frank's opinion that Lt. Puglisi did not give the appearance of one who believed he had done any thing wrong. These points are all relevant to the instructional error issue and whether the witness in fact violated any court order, which is important to the City's objection to the inclusion of the reference to the witness exclusion order in Special Instruction No. 18. The City concedes that the hearsay objection to the portion of the first sentence of paragraph 14 stating what Lt. Puglisi did testify to is valid. The remainder of the paragraph is not objectionable hearsay, however. What a witness does not testify to, or what a witness is not asked, are not hearsay. Mr. Frank has foundation and personal knowledge for the lines 7-11 on page 7 that are the subject of plaintiff's objection no. 33, since he was present in court for the events so described.

Response to Objections to Paragraph 15 of the Frank Declaration. 11.

Plaintiff's objection no. 34 relates to portions of Frank Declaration paragraph 15. The objections are the same series as with respect to the previous paragraphs, plus an argumentative objection. In Paragraph 15, Mr. Frank discusses the events of special instruction no. 18 and explains what Mr. Frank did and why he did so as to his objections and proposed amendments to that special instruction, based on his personal knowledge and reasoning, which is not offered for any hearsay purpose but if it were it would be subject to the state of mind exception of Ev. Code § 1250. With respect to the actual argument and rulings of the Court, the Motion for New Trial contains the citations to the record and the City relies on them rather than the Frank Declaration for those facts.

Response to Objections to Paragraph 16 of the Frank Declaration. 12.

Plaintiff's objections no. 35-39 relate to Frank Declaration paragraph 16. The objections are the same series as with respect to the previous paragraphs, plus argumentative objections. In Paragraph 16, Mr. Frank discusses some of the facts to which Sgt. Misquez and Lt. Puglisi testified about at trial and what they and Plaintiff discussed with Gardiner in sub-investigation # 34. The City concedes that much of this paragraph is hearsay, but not the two sentences concerning the order of sequence of witnesses at trial.

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Response to Objections to Paragraph 17 of the Frank Declaration. 13.

Plaintiff's objection no. 40 relates to the first two sentences of Frank Declaration paragraph 17. The objections are the same series as with respect to the previous paragraphs, plus an argumentative objection. In Paragraph 17, Mr. Frank discusses the fact of the jury's 9-3 verdict (a public record subject to the public records exception to the hearsay rule, Ev. Code § 1280) and his subjective reaction of surprise to the verdict and why. The latter is relevant to the prejudice issue and to the alternative JNOV or Motion for New Trial on the grounds of insufficient evidence, and is not hearsay because it reflects Mr. Frank's then-existing state of minds and to explain his conduct and actions immediately following the dismissal of the jurors, per Ev. Code § 1250.

Response to Objections to Paragraph 18 of the Frank Declaration. 14.

Plaintiff's objections no. 41-43 relate to most of Frank Declaration paragraph 18. The objections are the same series as with respect to the previous paragraphs, plus argumentative objections. In Paragraph 18, Mr. Frank discusses some of his immediate post-verdict discussion with trial jurors. While counsel's statement as to what jurors told him in the corridor are hearsay, those statements are subject to the spontaneous statement, contemporaneous statement, and state of mind exceptions contained in Ev. Code §§ 1240, 1241 and 1250. These propositions are relevant to the prejudice and instructional errors issues, and are from Mr. Frank's personal knowledge in the immediate post-verdict aftermath while the stress and excitement of the events were still fresh to the jurors.

Response to Objections to Paragraph 19 of the Frank Declaration. 15.

Plaintiff's objections no. 44-46 relate to most of Frank Declaration paragraph 19. The City concedes that the statements of juror no. 2 that are discussed in Frank Declaration Paragraph 19 are hearsay, but those statements are arguably subject to the spontaneous statement, contemporaneous statement, and state of mind exceptions contained in Ev. Code §§ 1240, 1241 and 1250. Juror No. 2's indication that the motivating cause issue was discussed during deliberations and that he believed there was insufficient proof of misconduct to justify termination are relevant to the juror misconduct and instructional error issues, as well as prejudice and the sufficiency of evidence issues. Mr. Frank's statement that Mr. Smith was standing close by when those juror statements were made is not hearsay nor objectionable. It is notable Mr. Smith did not even attempt to refute the statements that the various trial jurors told to Mr. Frank or to Deputy Chief Angel in his presence.

16. Response to Objections to Paragraph 20 of the Frank Declaration.

Plaintiff's objection no. 47 relates to Frank Declaration paragraph 20. The fact that jurors discussed the special instruction no. 18 and that the prepping of Lt. Puglisi was seen by some jurors as a violation of the witness exclusion order is relevant to the instructional error and prejudice issues. However, the City concedes that the statements of juror no. 9 that are discussed in Frank Declaration Paragraph 20 are hearsay and are not within any exception.

17. Response to Objections to Paragraph 21 of the Frank Declaration.

Plaintiff's objections no. 48-49 relate to most of Frank Declaration paragraph 21. In that paragraph, Mr. Frank details his consideration of the motion for new trial and its potential grounds, and the direction given to his firm's librarian Ms. Amberg to assist Mr. Frank in pursuit of his investigation into the jurors. There is no hearsay contained in paragraph 21 other than the statements Mr. Frank made to Ms. Amberg, which are subject to the state of mind and contemporaneous statement exceptions contained in Ev. Code §§ 1241 and 1250. The foundation for the propositions in paragraph 21 are Mr. Frank's personal knowledge, and the relevance is to lay the groundwork and foundation for the steps taken by Mr. Frank and Ms. Amberg that resulted in the discovery of jurors no. 6 and 7's criminal records.

18. Response to Objections to Paragraph 22 of the Frank Declaration.

Plaintiff's objections no. 50-51 relate to most of Frank Declaration paragraph 22.

Paragraph 22 contains Mr. Frank's summary of the juror profession information he provided to Ms Amberg for her Internet research, his review of some of the web pages or sites Ms. Amberg's research revealed, and his identification of jurors no. 6 and 7 from websites or account postings that Ms. Amberg identified for him. The foundation for the profession information was the sworn answers of the jurors during voir dire, and the foundation for Mr. Frank's identification of juror Nos. 6 and 7 was his personal knowledge from having seen the two jurors in court every day for

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over two weeks and hearing juror no. 6's voice in the immediate post-verdict hallway discussion just outside Department 50. Per Ev. Code §§ 1241 and 1250, Ms. Frank is offering some of the statements in paragraph 22 to explain what he and Ms. Amberg did and why they did it, and to prove or explain their acts and conduct. Mr. Frank's identification of the voice and image of juror No. 6 as the person depicted in the documentary film making company website and the image of juror No. 7 from a Twitter account for a person with the same name as Juror No. 6 and who like juror No. 6 described herself as a chef have obvious relevance to the juror misconduct issues and to the process of identifying the criminal records pertaining to those two jurors. The argumentative and speculation objections are unclear but lack merit as to any sentence or proposition in Paragraph 22. The City does not understand the Best Evidence Rule objection to paragraph 22, but assuming that it might refer to the video on the website or the photograph on the Twitter account, having the original video or photograph is not required for a witness identification.

19. Response to Objections to Paragraph 23 of the Frank Declaration.

Plaintiff's objections no. 52-54 relate to Frank Declaration paragraph 23. Paragraph 23 contains Mr. Frank's recitation of the fact that the criminal records he reviewed, as supplied by the LASC website and the certified criminal records, pertained to the persons whose pictured or video likeness and voice he was able to identify as jurors No. 6 and 7. Mr. Frank also states in that paragraph that neither trial Jurors No. 6 nor 7 revealed their prior contacts with law enforcement nor their respective self-assessments as to whether their prior contact would lead them to favor or disfavor a particular side in the trial. The foundation for the statements are contained in the Amberg Declaration and in the criminal records themselves. Some of those statements are hearsay, i.e., stating the content of the public records themselves, but the City relies on the certified records attached as exhibits for the substance of the criminal case records. The City is relying on Mr. Frank for his identification of the individuals with the same names as jurors no. 6 and 7, and on Ms. Amberg for her matching of the dates of birth listed on the criminal Complaints with the information revealed on the account or websites as to persons Mr. Frank identified as the two trial jurors of focus. The City concedes that Mr. Frank's characterization of -18 -

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juror no. 7's criminal proceedings as recent and the substance of her having a court date on the same March 5, 2012 date as her jury service in the instant trial are hearsay, but City contends that the public records exception applies.

Response to Objections to Paragraph 24 of the Frank Declaration. 20.

Plaintiff's objections no. 55-57 relate to Frank Declaration paragraph 24. Paragraph 24 contains Mr. Frank's summary of telephone conversations with several jurors after the trial, and a brief discussion of Mr. Frank's approach to the telephone interviews and his efforts to contact other trial jurors. The City concedes that much of this paragraph does contain hearsay, but some of it is offered to explain what Mr. Frank did and why he did it, and thus would be subject to the state of mind exception of Ev. Code § 1250. The foundation is Mr. Frank's personal knowledge and participation in the phone calls, and the relevance is show prejudice on the instructional issues and jury misconduct issues.

Response to Objections to Paragraph 25 of the Frank Declaration. 21.

Plaintiff's objection no. 58 relates to the first two sentences of Frank Declaration paragraph 25. Paragraph 25 describes Mr. Frank's post-verdict call with the alternate juror, who indicated that he would have voted for the City had he been allowed to participate in deliberation, which is highly relevant to the prejudice issue since if either of jurors No. 6 or 7 had been excused, the alternate juror would have voted and the jury would have hung. The first sentence of Frank Declaration paragraph 25 is not hearsay but the City concedes the second sentence is.

Response to Objections to Paragraph 26 of the Frank Declaration. 22.

Plaintiff's objections no. 59-61 relate to Frank Declaration paragraph 26. Paragraph 26 contains 3 sentences, none of which contain hearsay and all of which are based on the personal knowledge of Mr. Frank. The first sentence is a statement that Mr. Frank did not know or have any reason to suspect that trial Jurors No. 6 and 7 had criminal records until after the verdict. This point is relevant to case law regarding juror misconduct cases. The second sentence provides the foundation for the prejudice to the City of the jurors' failure to disclose their criminal records, i.e., that they deprived the defense of the ability to ask them follow-up questions regarding those contacts, to exercise possible challenges for cause, or to exercise one of the

remaining peremptory challenges. These are neither argumentative nor hearsay statement, but rather a statement of the facts as to how the information would or could have been used during the trial. The third sentence is another straightforward fact within the personal knowledge of trial counsel, i.e., that the defense only exercised 2 peremptory challenges to the 12 seated jurors, meaning there were many remaining peremptory challenges the defense could have used.

23. Response to Objections to Paragraph 27 of the Frank Declaration.

Plaintiff's objections no. 62-67 relate to Frank Declaration paragraph 27. Paragraph 27 contains Mr. Frank's opinion there was no factual basis for a reasonable juror to find that plaintiff's termination was motivated by any retaliatory animus, in part to explain why the verdict in favor of the plaintiff surprised him, and in part to lay the foundation for the moving papers' argument as to why there was an insufficiency of evidence on retaliatory animus. Mr. Frank qualifies as an expert and his opinion tends in reason to show that a new trial or JNOV should be granted on the grounds of insufficient evidence. Mr. Frank's summary of the testimony of certain witnesses is concededly hearsay.

24. Response to Objections to Paragraph 28 of the Frank Declaration.

Plaintiff's objections no. 68-69 relate to Frank Declaration paragraph 28. Paragraph 28 contains Mr. Frank's summary of the economic damages figure awarded by the jury and the three scenarios to which plaintiff's economist Karen Smith testified. The relevance of this information was to demonstrate that the jury's damages award appears to eschew any so-called "demotion" damages because the jury was given the option of awarding for the loss of pay and benefits between Plaintiff being a Deputy Chief and his being a Captain, but they elected the smaller amount. This summary avoided attaching most of the economists' testimony, and was based on Mr. Frank's attendance at the trial rather than his reading of the transcript. The last sentence of this paragraph contains the substance of Mr. Frank's post-trial interview of two jurors on the "demotion" issue, which the City concedes is hearsay.

25. Response to Objections to Paragraph 29 of the Frank Declaration.

Plaintiff's objection no. 70 relates to Frank Declaration paragraph 29. Paragraph 29 simply attaches pertinent pages for the reporter's transcript from James Gardiner's testimony and - 20 -

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lists the pages attached. Since Mr. Frank ordered the trial transcript, reviewed it post-trial, selected the pages to be included in the brief in support of the Motion for New Trial, and is a custodian of his firm's files for this action, he obviously has the foundation to select and attach pages for the official reporter's transcript. Plaintiff's shot gun repeated objections on grounds of argumentativeness, speculation, hearsay, relevance, assuming facts, Best Evidence Rule, etc. plainly lack merit.

Response to Objections to Paragraphs 30 and 31 of the Frank Declaration. 26. Plaintiff's objections no. 71-72 relate to Frank Declaration paragraphs 30 and 31, which simply attach pertinent pages for the reporter's transcript from Tim Stehr's and Janice Lowers' trial testimony respectively, and lists the pages attached. The City's comments for Paragraph 29 apply equally to these meritless objections.

27. Response to Objections to Paragraph 32 of the Frank Declaration. Plaintiff's objection no. 73 relates to Frank Declaration paragraph 32, which simply attaches pertinent pages for the reporter's transcript from Plaintiff Taylor's own trial testimony and lists the pages attached. The City's comments for Paragraph 29 apply equally to these meritless objections.

28. Response to Objections to Paragraphs 33-37 of the Frank Declaration. Plaintiff's objections no. 74-78 relate to Frank Declaration paragraph 33-37, which simply attach pertinent pages for the reporter's transcript from the trial testimony of witnesses Puglisi. Misquez, Varner, Angel, and LaChasse, respectively, and lists the pages attached. The City's comments for Paragraph 29 apply equally to these meritless objections.

29. Response to Objections to Paragraph 38 of the Frank Declaration.

Plaintiff's final objection to the Frank Declaration is an objection to Exhibit 3, an article from the March 2012 DRI publication entitled For the Defense. The article is not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, but rather to explain what Mr. Frank did and why he did it on requesting voir dire questions and his participation in voir dire during the trial. The foundation for the article is that Mr. Frank is a member of DRI and receives its monthly magazine, which

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contained the article of interest which he read. It is essentially a scholarly article of the sort that experts rely upon, and Mr. Frank qualifies as a expert on trial advocacy.

C. Response to the 17 Objections to Linda Miller Savitt Declaration

Plaintiff objected to 17 different portions of the Declaration of Linda Miller Savitt, trial counsel for the City. There was no objection to the first two paragraphs of her Declaration, but virtually every other sentence drew multiple objections.

1. Response to Objections to all of Paragraph 3

Plaintiff's objections nos. 1-4 relate to the entirety paragraph 3 of the Declaration of Ms. Savitt on grounds including relevance, hearsay, lacks foundation, assumes facts not in evidence, argumentative, best evidence rule, vague and ambiguous, and compound³ all without any specificity or explanation. Each objection lacks merit. In paragraph 3, Ms. Savitt explains that ferreting out prospective jurors' contacts with law enforcement was material to City in assessing bias on voir dire, and she explains her personal observations of what transpired during voir dire. Ms. Savitt is relating her personal knowledge and reasoning to explain what she did and observed, which is not offered for any hearsay purpose. The relevance is that the Court considered the use of force and law enforcement contact questions to be sufficiently germane and important in the case that it selected those question from the 20 or so topics the City requested as ones to actually inquire about. Ms. Savitt further gave the sequence of timing of the Court's inquiries of prospective jurors about these topics, i.e., prior to attorney voir dire, and then again when replacement prospective jurors were seated following excusals of several jurors for cause or upon exercises by both sides of peremptory challenges. These statements are also based on Ms. Savitt's personal knowledge from the trial and the conduct of the proceedings. Finally, Ms. Savitt states that neither of the two jurors who are the subject of the juror misconduct issues raised in the Motion for New Trial responded to the negative contact question, nor did either avail themselves

³ As with the Amberg and Frank objections, Plaintiff piles on extraneous objections as to the first paragraph in the Savitt Declaration such as "compound" and "vague and ambiguous," with no explanation as to what is vague or why a sentence in a Declaration (as opposed to a question of a witness) can be objectionably compound. City will not reiterate this point as to each of the objections to the Savitt Declaration since it would be the same response as set forth above.

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of the private sidebar option. It is not hearsay to report that another person failed to speak. The fact that the two focused jurors failed to disclose anything in response to the law enforcement contact questions is plainly relevant to the juror misconduct issues raised by the Motion for New Trial, i.e., that two jurors who turned out to have criminal records failed to reveal them.

2. Response to Objections to all of Paragraph 4

Plaintiff's objections nos. 5-10 relate to the entirety of paragraph 4 of Ms. Savitt's Declaration on grounds that it is irrelevant, lacks foundation and assumes facts not in evidence. speculation, argumentative, hearsay, and best evidence rule. Again, these objections lack merit. In paragraph 4 of her declaration, Ms. Savitt explains her goals during voir dire. Further, she relates her personal experience and observations from this and past trials regarding the effect of juror concealment of information on voir dire, and her impression of judge's intentions when asking in voir dire whether prospective jurors can wait until they hear all of the evidence before making up their mind. These propositions are from Ms. Savitt's personal knowledge and experience, and are not offered for any hearsay purpose but if they were they would be subject to the state of mind exception of Ev. Code § 1250. Again they are relevant to the prejudice issue and to explain the voir dire strategy that was negatively impacted by jurors' failures to disclose their initial impression and biases. In addition, Ms. Savitt explains that she requested CACI 100 be read to the jury and it was, which is again a statement of what she did and observed, and is relevant to the prejudice issue and was not offered for any hearsay purpose. To the extent that the trial transcript is the best evidence of the Court reading CACI 100 to the jury, this objection is conceded.

3. Response to Objections to all of Paragraph 5

Plaintiff's objections nos. 11-14 relate to the entirety of paragraph 5 of Ms. Savitt's Declaration. The objections are the same series as with respect to the previous paragraphs. In paragraph 5, Ms. Savitt details when and how she and Mr. Frank discovered that CACI 2405 had been mistakenly omitted from the defense list of proposed jury instructions and how counsel attempted to rectify that error in a timely fashion. These proposition are relevant to the instructional error issue, to address the objections as to timeliness of the submission of the

proposed instruction, and to lay the foundation for making a record of the City's position. They are all taken from Ms. Savitt's personal knowledge, and are not offered for any hearsay purpose but if they were they would be subject to the state of mind exception of Ev. Code § 1250. Ms. Savitt also states that had the Court agreed to give CACI 2405, she would have used it in her closing arguments and she would have used the Elmo to show the instruction to the jury. This is relevant to the issue of prejudice to the City and in explaining why the elements of CACI 2405 were not presented to the jury in closing arguments as she did for other instructions. These statements are also from Ms. Savitt's personal knowledge and fall under the state of mind exception of Ev. Code § 1250.

4. Response to Objections to all of Paragraph 6

Plaintiff's objections nos. 15-17 relate to the entirety of paragraph 6 of Ms. Savitt's declaration. The objections are the same series as with respect to the previous paragraphs.

Paragraph 6 contains 3 sentences, none of which contain hearsay and all of which are based on the personal knowledge of Ms. Savitt. The first sentence is a statement that Ms. Savitt did not know or have any reason to suspect that trial Jurors No. 6 and 7 had criminal records until after the verdict. This point is relevant to case law regarding juror misconduct cases. The second sentence provides the foundation for the prejudice to the City of the jurors' failure to disclose their criminal records, i.e., that they deprived the defense of the ability to ask them follow-up questions regarding those contacts, to exercise possible challenges for cause, or to exercise one of the remaining peremptory challenges. These are neither argumentative nor hearsay statement, but rather a statement of the facts as to how the information would or could have been used during the trial. The third sentence is another straightforward fact within the personal knowledge of trial counsel, i.e., that the defense only exercised 2 peremptory challenges to the 12 seated jurors, meaning there were many remaining peremptory challenges the defense could have used.

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By:

Ronald F. Frank

Attorneys for Defendant, City of Burbank

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BURBANK'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS RE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR JNOV

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PROOF OF SERVICE BY OVERNIGHT DELIVERY

1	PROOF OF SERVICE BY OVERLANDS	 	
	I am a citizen of the United States and employed in Los Angeles County, California. I am		
	are of eighteen years and not a party to the within-entitled action. My business address		
3	is 444 South Flower Street, Suite 2400, Los Angeles, California 90071-2953. On May 30, 2012,		
4	I deposited with Overnite Express, a true and correct copy of the within documents:		
5	DEFENDANT CITY OF BURBANK'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S		
ų.	OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL		
7	OR ALTERNATIVE JNOV in a sealed envelope, addressed as follows:		
8	OR ALTERNATIVE JNOV in a scaled sirvereps, and		
9	Gregory W. Smith, Esq. Christopher Brizzolara, Esq. 1528 16th Street		
10	Law Offices of Gregory W. Smith 9100 Wilshire Blyd 0.0212 Santa Monica, CA 90404 Santa Monica, CA 90404		
11	Beverly Hills, CA 90212		
12	Linda Miller Savitt, Esq. Amelia Ann Albano, City Attorney	ţ	
13	Phillip L. Reznik, Esq. Carol A. Humiston, Sr. Asst.		
14	Savitt, LLP 275 Fast Olive Avenue		
15	500 North Brand Boulevard Post Office Box 6459		
16	Glendale, CA 91203-9940		
17	Following ordinary business practices, the envelope was sealed and placed for collection by Overnite Express on this date, and would, in the ordinary course of business, be retrieved by		
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